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The association between corporate governance and firm value has been extensively studied in Chinese listed firms. Based on the characteristics of their ultimate shareholders, Chinese listed firms can be categorised as (1) central statecontrolled, (2) local state-controlled or (3) non-state-controlled. Some scholars have described Chinese government policy as 'zhuada fangxiao', thus suggesting that the corporate governance mechanisms (CGMs) of central state-controlled listed firms (SCLFs) are better than those of local state-controlled listed firms. Therefore, this paper specifically examines the influence of CGMs on the value of central SCLFs and local SCLFs. 1. Introduction
Historical development
Since launching its open door policy in 1978, the Chinese government has continued to reform the corporate policies of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and has improved connections between the state economy and the market economy. As SOEs are a substantial part of the national economy and of government revenue, the Chinese government has gradually privatized SOEs to raise funds for expansions and to increase efficiency. The history of this gradual transformation of Chinese SOEs is summarized in Table 1 .
Most Chinese listed firms were established through the privatization of SOEs. To maintain their dominant position, equity in listed firms is divided into A-shares, B-shares, H-shares, state-owned shares, institutional shares, employee shares and other shares, but only A-, B-and H-shares can be freely traded. A-and B-shares are generally traded on two domestic stock exchanges whereas H-shares are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Before the share reform 1 of 2005, state shares could not be traded on any stock exchange (i.e., they were non-tradable shares). Table 2 
Motivation of the study
Traditional SOEs were initially ideological organizations created as work units (gongzuo danwei) to serve social and political purposes rather than to meet economic objectives. The primary stakeholders of SOEs were public officials, government bureaucrats and top managers appointed to run the SOEs, who enjoyed the same privileges as state cadres (guojia ganbu). Secondary stakeholders were the SOEs' workers, who expected an 'iron rice bowl' (tiefanwan) with cradle-to-grave benefits (Hua et al., 2006) .
State ownership is widely viewed as, and has been repeatedly demonstrated to be, inefficient (Boycko et al., 1995) . Both the profit motives and the political motives of government officials have the potential to significantly distort objective policy (Trebilcock and Iacobucci, 2003) . Recognizing these potential problems, the Chinese government has been gradually privatizing its SOEs, either through management buyouts or by going public (i.e., by listing them on the Chinese and Hong Kong stock markets).
Reform of state-owned enterprises (zhuada fangxiao policy)
The early economic reform that introduced the price system and profit incentives to SOEs did not significantly improve their performance. Consequently, President Jiang Zemin announced the zhuada fangxiao policy (grasp the large, release the small) at the Fifteenth Communist Party Congress in 1997. Under this policy, the central government retained ownership of SOEs that (1) produce defence goods and services, (2) are in industrial sectors targeted for economic development or (3) are insolvent, but employed millions of employees.
2 The central government decided that the state should withdraw from the competitive sectors of the national economy and only concentrate on strategic industries. The zhuada fangxiao strategy was therefore announced as the guiding principle for SOE reform, which after various experiments at local levels has been interpreted as privatizing all but the largest SOEs controlled by the central government or the central SOEs (Leng, 2009 ).
